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No Link: the Jury and the Origins
of the Confrontation Right and the
Hearsay Rule
RICHARD D FRIEDMAN (ANN ARBOR)*

The rule against hearsay has long been one of the most distinctive elements of the common law of evidence, and indeed—except for recent
changes on the civil side in many jurisdictions—of the common law system of trial. Observers have long believed that the rule, like most of the
other exclusionary rules of the common law of evidence, is "the child of
the jury system".1 Though Edmund Morgan argued vigorously to the contrary,2 the received understanding is that the jury's inability to account satisfactorily for the defects of hearsay explains the rule.3 A famous, and
perhaps seminal, expression of this view was that of Chief Justice
Mansfield in Re Berkeley:
"[I]n England, where the jury are the sole judges of the fact, hearsay is properly excluded, because no man can tell what effect it might have upon their
minds".4

Copyright © 2002. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. All rights reserved.

In recent years, the abolition of the hearsay rule as a doctrine of exclusion in
civil litigation in Britain has been predicated on the near-total absence of the
* This paper is largely based on research I have been doing with Mike Macnair. I am, however, responsible for the contents of this paper and any mistakes in it.
1
This is the celebrated term applied to the law of evidence in general in J B Thayer, A
Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law (Boston, Little, Brown, 1898), 266,
based in part on the danger that the evidence is "likely to be misused or overestimated by that
body".
2
"The essays of the great Thayer, the rationalisations of the judges beginning in the third
or fourth decade of the 19th century and the acceptance of these by Wigmore have combined
to make orthodox the fallacy that the exclusionary rules of evidence, and particularly, the
hearsay rule, are results of the jury system." Foreword to American Law Institute, Model
Code of Evidence (Philadelphia, American Law Institute, 1942), at 36.
3
See C Tapper, "Hearsay in Criminal Cases: An Overview of Law Commission Report No.
245", [1997] Crim LR 771 at 777 and n. 43.
4
4 Camp. 401 at 415, 171 ER 128 at 135 (1811). Mansfield distinguished the situation in
Scotland, where judges were the finders of fact, and could "trust themselves entirely" to give
hearsay such weight as they thought it deserved.
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jury from such litigation.5 Colin Tapper, a highly sophisticated scholar of
evidence, has expressed the perplexity that:
"[W]hile the absence of a jury from most modern civil proceedings has been a
major contributory factor to the separate development of the hearsay rule in civil
and criminal proceedings, the comparable difference between summary proceedings and trials on indictment within the area of criminal proceedings has failed to
lead to a comparable separation of development".6
Even on its face, this emphasis on the role of the jury in explaining the
hearsay rule is a rather curious one: there is no reason to believe that, as a
general matter, the jurors will so over-value hearsay that the truth-determination process is improved by shutting their ears to it. Indeed, the empirical
evidence suggests that jurors tend to under-value hearsay.7 More fundamentally, this view ignores history, which demonstrates rather clearly that at the
core of the hearsay rule is the fundamental right of a litigant, especially a
criminal defendant, to confront the witnesses against him. This right has a
scope much narrower than the modern rule against hearsay, and it does not
explain or justify all of hearsay law. But it has roots that are deep and broad.
It is one of the cornerstones of the common law system of adjudication, and
it is not substantially affected by whether or not the trier of fact is a jury.
Any adjudicative system based on evidence must determine how witnesses are to give evidence. A particularly common requirement, one shared by
the common law as well as many systems that do not rely on a jury, is that a
witness testify under oath. And throughout history many systems, whether
they use the jury or not, have required that a witness give testimony in the
presence of the accused. Thus, in Acts, 25.16, the Roman governor Festus
declares:
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"It is not the manner of the Romans to deliver any man to die, before that he
which is accused have the accusers face to face, and have licence to answer for
himself concerning the crime laid against him."
Here we see an early, but quite clear, expression of the confrontation right:
when a witness testifies, she must do it "face to face" with the accused, pre5
Civil Evidence Act 1995, s. 1, which provides that "[i]n civil proceedings evidence shall
not be excluded on the ground that it is hearsay", resulted from a recommendation by the Law
Commission for England and Wales, which emphasised "the greatly reduced use of juries in
civil trials other than for defamation proceedings". The Law Commission for England and
Wales, The Hearsay Rule in Civil Proceedings, Consultation Paper No. 117 (London, HMSO,
1991), 52. The 1995 Act was foreshadowed by a similar development in Scotland. See Civil
Evidence Act, 1988, c. 32, s. 2 (abolishing the rule against hearsay in civil cases); Scottish Law
Commission, Evidence: Report on Corroboration, Hearsay and Related Matters in Civil
Proceedings, Report No 100 (Edinburgh, HMSO, 1986), 16-17 (emphasising the limited use of
the civil jury), 23 (recommending the abolition of the rule against hearsay).
6
Tapper, supra n. 3, 777.
7
P Miene, R C Park and E Borgida, "Juror Decision Making and the Evaluation of
Hearsay Evidence", (1992) 76 Minnesota LR 683.
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sumably in front of the trier of fact. It is not acceptable for her to testify
through intermediaries.
This confrontational method of giving testimony has not been universal.
To minimise the dangers of intimidation, traditional Continental systems
took testimony out of the presence of the parties, though they protected the
right of cross-examination through written interrogatories. But this was not
the English norm. In the middle of the sixteenth century, Sir Thomas Smith
described the heart of a criminal trial as an open "altercation" between
accuser and accused.8 And repeatedly, over hundreds of years, English
judges and commentators declared the superiority of English law in this
respect. For example, in the Case of the Union of the Realms, Lord Chief
Justice Popham, arguing for the superiority of English over Scots law, contended that "the Testimonies, being viva voce before the Judges in open face
of the world", were "much to be preferred" over "written depositions in a
corner".9
To be sure, even in England, the norm of confrontation was not always
followed. But the situations in which it was not followed reveal the strength
and ultimate triumph of the principle that testimony must be given in the
presence of the adverse party—and the irrelevance of the jury to that norm.
First, the common law courts shared an uneasy coexistence with the
courts of equity and other courts that followed Continental procedures.
One advantage of those procedures was that a deposition could preserve the
testimony of a witness if the witness was unable later to testify at trial.
Common law courts came to accept these depositions as a second-best alternative to trial testimony in the case of an unavailable witness. Indeed, by the
middle of the seventeenth century the courts developed a sophisticated body
of law determining when depositions were acceptable and ensuring that a
deposition could not be used as evidence unless the adverse party had an
adequate opportunity of cross-examination through written interrogatories.10 Thus, Sir Geoffrey Gilbert, commenting in the first years of the eighteenth century on a case from several decades earlier, wrote:
"A Deposition can't be given in Evidence against any Person that was not Party to
the Suit, and the Reason is, because he had not Liberty to cross-examine the
8
T Smith, De Republica Anglorum, ed. by M Dewar (Cambridge, University Press, 1982),
Bk2,ch. 15.
9
Moore (KB) 790 at 798, 72 ER 908 at 913 (1604). See also, e.g., S Emlyn, Preface to State
Trials (London, J Walthoe, Sen., 1730); M Hale, History of the Common Law, ed. by C M
Gray (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1971), 163—4; W Blackstone, Commentaries on
the Laws of England (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1765-69), vol. 3, *373.
10
Fortescue v. Coake, Godb. 193, 78 ER 117 (Com. Pleas, 1612); Anon., Godb. 326, 78 ER
192 (KB 1623); Rushworth v. Countess de Pembroke & Currier, Hardres 472, 145 ER 553
(1668). This law developed more rapidly and systematically in civil cases. This disparity presumably occurred in part because of the presence of counsel in civil cases and in part because
of the use, discussed in the text below, in criminal cases of examinations taken before magistrates.
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Witnesses, and 'tis against natural Justice that a Man should be concluded in a
Cause to which he never was a Party".11
Similarly, magistrates acting pursuant to statutes passed in the reign of
Queen Mary took statements from accusing witnesses in felony cases. It
seems rather clear that the expectation, and at least the usual practice, was
for the accused to be present when this accusatory statement was taken. 12
Quickly, the practice arose of taking these statements under oath, the understanding being that doing so would preserve the testimony for use at trial if
the witness died beforehand. As William Lambarde, writing a manual for
justices of the peace in 1581, explained:
"[I]f these informers bee examined upon Oath, then although it should happen
them to die before the Prisoner have his Triall, yet their information may bee given
in evidence, as a matter of credite, whereas otherwise it wold be of little or no
weight at all, & therby offenders shold the easlier escape unpunished".13
It was clear that, if the accuser was not dead, or unable to travel, or put out
of the way by the accused, this pre-trial statement could not be used; the
witness must testify live at the trial. 14 And in 1696, the justices of the Courts
of King's Bench and of Common Pleas determined after a consultation that
this practice should not be extended to misdemeanour cases, where it was
not supported by tradition and statutory authority—and they did so specifically on the basis that:
"the defendant not being present when [the statements] were taken before the
[examining authority, in this case the mayor], and so had lost the benefit of a
cross-examination".15
Finally, of great significance was the practice in treason cases and other
politically charged trials. The Crown, eager to use the criminal law as a
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11
G Gilbert, The Law of Evidence (London, 1754), 47. Mike Macnair has dated the writing of the treatise, which was published long after Gilbert's death, to the first decade of the
century.
12

The statutes required the magistrate to take a statement from the accused as well as from
the person who brought him in, so the statements were presumably taken in close time proximity. Professor J M Beattie, who has studied the reports of these statements extensively—
though without addressing this question—says that the accused's familiarity with the
accusatory statement appears to be a presupposition of the accused's statement.
13
W Lambarde, Eirenarcha: or Of the Office of the Justices of Peace 210 (London,
Imprinted by Ra. Newbry and H Bynneman, by the ass. of Ri. Tot[ell] & Ch. Bar[ker], 1581),
quoted in J H Langbein, Prosecuting Crime in the Renaissance: England, Germany, France
(Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press, 1974), at 27. The principal statute, 1 & 2 Ph. &
M., c. 13, required examination of those that "bring" the accused; it did not refer explicitly to
accusing witnesses, and most often it was the constable who brought the accused to the justice
of the peace. But it appears that the constable was usually accompanied by the accusing witnesses, and this was the practice recommended by Lambarde—presumably because of the
opportunity it offered for preserving testimony. See Langbein, supra, at 11-12.
14
See the notes following R v. Paine, 1 Salk. 281,91 ER 246 (1696).
15
R v. Paine, 5 Mod. 163 at 165, 87 ER 584 at 585.
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means of controlling its adversaries, sometimes used testimony taken out of
the presence of the accused. Thus, it is in the treason cases of the Tudor and
Stuart period that the battle for the confrontation right was most clearly
fought. As early as 1521, treason defendants, often using the term "face to
face", demanded that the witnesses be brought before them. 16 Sometimes
these demands were heeded,17 sometimes not—but what is most notable is
that they found recurrent support in acts of Parliament, which repeatedly
required that accusing witnesses be brought "face to face" with the defendant.18 By the middle of the seventeenth century, the battle was won, and
courts clearly understood that treason witnesses must testify before the
accused, subject to questioning by the accused.19
Well into that century, prosecutorial authorities often tried to use confessions of alleged accomplices of the accused that were not made according to the usual norms of testimony, under oath and before the accused.
The case of Sir Walter Raleigh is the most notorious, but far from the only
one. The theory was that self-accusation was "as strong as if upon
oath".20 But the judges soon realised the iniquity of allowing an exception
to the usual norms of testimony simply because the accomplice accused
himself as well as another.21 In 1662, shortly after the Restoration, the
judges of the King's Bench ruled unanimously and definitively that,
16
E.g., Seymour's Case, 1 How. St. Tr. 483 at 492 (1549); Duke of Somerset's Trial, 1 How.
St. Tr. 515 at 520 (1551).
17
According to E Hall, The Union of the Two Noble and Illustre Famelies of Lancastre &
Yorke (London, 1548), published under the title Hall's Chronicle (London, J Johnson, 1809),
623, the witnesses against the Duke of Buckingham in 1521 were produced at his request.
Hall's account of Buckingham's trial appears to be the ultimate source for the one offered by
Shakespeare and Fletcher in King Henry VIII, II,i. John Spelman, a justice of the King's Bench,
was careful to note in his report of a treason trial of 1531 that the accuser confronted the
defendant "face to face." R v. Rice ap Griffith, in The Reports of Sir John Spelman, ed. by J H
Baker, Seld. S o c , vol. 93 (London, 1976), vol. 1, 47.
18
5 & 6 Edw. VI, c. 11, s. 9 (1552), and 1 & 2 P. & M., c. 10, s 11 (1554), required witnesses
to be "brought forth in person" before the accused. 1 Eliz. I, c. 1, s. 21 (1558), 1 Eliz. I, c.5, s. 10
(1558), 13 Eliz. I, c. 1, s. 9 (1571), and 13 Car. II, c.l, s. 5 (1661), all used the "face to face" formulation.
19
For example, in the celebrated case of John Lilburne in 1649, there was n o d o u b t that the
witnesses would testify live in front of Lilburne; "hear what the witnesses say first," said t h e
presiding judge in postponing one of Lilburne's arguments: 4 How. St. Tr. 1270 at 1329. When
the witnesses did testify, Lilburne was allowed to pose questions to them, t h r o u g h t h e court:
ibid, at 1333, 1334, 1335, 1340. In John Mordant's Case, just nine years later, there does n o t
seem to have been any d o u b t that he could question t h e witnesses directly, which he d i d , 5
How. St. Tr. 907 at 9 1 9 - 2 1 . Indeed, at one point the presiding judge solicitously inquired
whether M o r d a n t wished to ask a witness any questions, ibid, at 922, a p r a c t i c e t h a t s o o n
became routine: e.g., Colledge's Case, 8 How. St. Tr. 549, at 599, 603, 606 (1681).
20
Earl of Somerset's Case, 2 How. St. Tr. 966 at 986 (1616) (Coke, CJ).
21
In 1631, t h e judges concluded that, at the trial of a peer before the H o u s e of Lords,
"[c]ertain Examinations [clearly confessions from the context] having been taken by the lords
without an oath ... could not be used until they were repeated upon o a t h . " Lord Audley's Case,
3 How. St. Tr. 401 at 402 (1631).
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though a pre-trial confession was "evidence against the Party himself who
made the Confession" and, if adequately proved could indeed support
conviction of that person without witnesses to the treason itself, the confession "cannot be used as evidence against any others whom on his
Examination he confessed to be in the Treason".22 This fundamental principle quickly became canonical.23
Thus, there was a clear—though not entirely uncluttered—norm that guided English civil and criminal trials, that witnesses should give their testimony
in open court, face to face with the adverse party. Nowhere in the development
of this norm of confrontation does any deficiency on the part of the jury
appear to have been mentioned. The concern was not the jury's inability to
deal with secondary evidence but rather the fact that such evidence did not
conform to proper procedural conceptions. And only rarely was such evidence
referred to as hearsay. As is apparent from Gilbert's perfunctory treatment,
hearsay had a limited meaning, one conforming closely to what even now is
probably the common lay understanding of the term—a witness's account of
what another person had said. Even quite late in the eighteenth century, the
term hearsay would not have been used to refer to written transcriptions of
previously taken testimony, or indeed to other writings offered as evidence.24
Furthermore, the norm of confrontation did not extend the full breadth
of the modern legal conception of hearsay. Under that conception, hearsay
is any statement made out of court and offered to prove the truth of a matter that the statement asserts. The confrontation norm, however, was a principle that governed the procedures for the giving of testimony. Around the
beginning of the nineteenth century, probably because of the growing role of
lawyers in criminal trials, courts and treatise writers became far more sensitive to the absence of cross-examination with respect to out-of-court statements that were not made for the purpose of giving testimony. Hearsay
became the rubric under which this concern was expressed, and the category
of hearsay expanded to include writings. 25 Almost inevitably, then, the
22

Case of Thomas Tong and Others, Kelyng 17 at 18, 84 ER 1061 a t 1062 (1662).
See Gilbert, supra n. 11, 99; W Hawkins, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown (London,
printed by Eliz. Nutt and R Gosling, assigns of Edward Sayer for J Walthoe jun., 1721), vol. 2,
429.
24
Cf. F Buller, An Introduction to the Law Relative to Trials at 2V/s» Prius (London, printed
by W Strahan and M Woodfall for C Bathurst 1772), 2 3 5 - 6 (saying t h a t depositions can be
admitted "in general in all Cases where Hearsay and Reputation a r e Evidence; for undoubtedly what a Witness, who is dead, has sworn in a C o u r t of Justice, is of more Credit, than what
another Person swears he has heard him say").
25
T Peake, A Compendium of the Law of Evidence (London, E and R Brooke and J Rider,
1801), 10. Peake says, in the course of his discussion of hearsay, t h a t certain written memoranda made in the ordinary course of business are admissible as " n o t within the exception as to
hearsay evidence". T h e backhand suggestion a p p e a r s t o be t h a t other writings would be
"within the exception" - that is, objectionable as hearsay. By 1815, S M Phillipps made the
principle clear: T h e exclusionary rule "is applicable to s t a t e m e n t s in writing, no less than to
23
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hearsay rule also expanded to include the long-established rules governing
when depositions of a witness, taken under oath before trial, could be introduced in lieu of trial testimony.26 And eventually the expansion included
conduct that did not assert the proposition at issue but appeared to reflect
the actor's belief in it.27 Now the modern shape of the hearsay rule was
complete.28
The expansions that yielded this form of the rule could not all be justified
on the basis of the need to protect the conditions under which testimony is
given, because conduct that was ante litem was not testimonial in nature.
Perhaps for this reason, it is in this same era that we first see the justifications for the hearsay rule being laid at the feet of the jury. The analysis here
suggests, however, that the jury had very little to do with the development of
the hearsay rule. Nor should it have much to do with the question of
whether, or in what form, the rule ought to be retained.
On the one hand, at the core of the hearsay rule is a noble principle that it
is critical to preserve. This principle is the confrontation norm—the requirement that a witness must testify openly, in the presence of the accused and
subject to cross-examination. The modern hearsay rule is too poorly articulated, too broad, and too riddled with exceptions to protect that principle
ideally well. Not only does the principle remain valid, however; it may be
considered a fundamental aspect of fair criminal procedure, whether a jury
is present or not. Indeed, in a highly ironic development, the European
Court of Human Rights—operating outside the context of a system that
has either the jury or hearsay law—has recognised the significance of the
confrontation right and issued a series of decisions protecting it.29
On the other hand, to the extent that the hearsay rule excludes evidence
where the confrontation norm is not at stake—for example, statements
made ante litem—the justification for the rule seems dubious. Certainly the
rule has significant costs, most notably in the loss of valuable information to
the truth-determining process. Perhaps other justifications, such as the creation of incentives to present live testimony, justify limited application of an
exclusionary rule. But whether this is true or not, the presence or absence of
the jury as trier of fact should have very little bearing. Perhaps in time there
will be persuasive reason to believe that juries tend to over-value hearsay
words spoken", the only difference in this respect being that there is greater facility of proof
in the case of writings than of oral statements: S M Phillipps, A Treatise on the Law of
Evidence (New York, Gould, Banks and Gould, 1816), vol. 1, 173. Phillipps' analysis does not
appear to have gained immediate universal acceptance.
26

Phillipps, supra n. 2 3 , 177-8 (discussing t h e c e l e b r a t e d Berkeley case, 4 C a m p . 4 0 1 , 171
ER 127 (1811)).
27
Wright v. Tatham, 5 Cl. & F. 6 7 0 , 7 ER 559, 4 7 Rev. Rep. 136 ( H L 1838).
28
See, for example, the quite modern-sounding explanation in T Starkie, A Practical
Treatise on the Law of Evidence (Boston, Wells and Lillie, 1826), vol. 1,47 (Pt. I, S 28).
29
E.g., Van Mechelen v. Netherlands, 25 E H R R 6 4 7 (1998).
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evidence by so much that truth-determination is advanced by shutting their
eyes and ears to such evidence. I doubt it, though, and until such time the
jury-defect theory should be considered as nothing more than an unsupported rationale accepted unquestioningly in a bygone era.30
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See supra n. 7.

